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All Anchors Are Not Created Equal:
The Effects of Per Diem versus Lump Sum Requests
on Pain and Suffering Awards
Bradley D. McAuliff 1 and Brian H. Bornstein 2
1. Department of Psychology, California State University, Northridge, CA, USA
2. Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, NE, USA

1996; Hinsz & Indahl, 1995; Marti & Wissler, 2000). A
second potential reference point for jurors that has received virtually no empirical attention is the use of per
diem arguments. The standard or “pure” per diem argument involves an attorney (typically the plaintiff’s)
suggesting a small unit of time and then assigning it a
small monetary value (e.g., $240/day) that represents its
worth for the plaintiff. Although the name “per diem”
implies that one day is the uniform time unit in these
arguments, attorneys have used a variety of time units
(hour, week, month, year) to quantify damage awards
for jurors (King, 2003).

Abstract
This experiment examined whether different quantifications
of the same damage award request ($175,000 lump sum, $10/
hour, $240/day, $7300/month for 2 years) influenced pain
and suffering awards compared to no damage award request.
Jury-eligible community members (N = 180) read a simulated
personal injury case in which defendant liability already had
been determined. Awards were: (1) larger for the $10/hour
and $175,000 conditions than the $7300/month and control
conditions and (2) more variable for the $10/hour condition
than the $7300/month and control conditions. No differences
emerged on ratings of the parties, their attorneys, or the difficulty of picking a compensation figure. We discuss the theoretical implications of our data for the anchoring and adjustment
literature and the practical implications for legal professionals.

Legal Status of Per Diem Arguments

Keywords: Per diem arguments, Anchoring and adjustment,
Juror pain and suffering awards, Civil litigation

Attorneys usually have considerable leeway in making
oral arguments, but efforts to use per diem arguments
have met with mixed success in U.S. courts (Pearson,
2002). Some judges have ruled that per diem arguments
are improper because they are based on speculation and
cannot be supported by the evidence (Parker v. Artery,
1995 ; Ramstad v. Lear Siegler Diversified Holdings Corp.,
1993) or that they mislead juries and result in excessive
verdicts (Carchidi v. Rodenhiser, 1989 ; Johnson v. Colglazier,
1965). In contrast, other judges have held that per diem
arguments are permissible inferences drawn from the ev-

Jurors in personal injury cases must determine the economic and noneconomic damages necessary to compensate victims. Experts often provide testimony to
help jurors determine economic losses such as medical
expenses and lost wages, but little guidance is offered
for noneconomic losses like pain and suffering (Greene
& Bornstein, 2000; Wissler, Kuehn, & Saks, 2000). One
well-studied exception is the plaintiff’s ad damnum or
lump sum request for damages (Chapman & Bornstein,
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idence (Cafferty v. Monson, 1985 ; Streeter v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 1988) and that it is logically inconsistent to allow a
lump sum request without permitting attorneys to present how that amount might be broken down to represent
different periods of time (Beagle v. Vasold, 1966).
These legal decisions involving per diem arguments
and their underlying assumptions raise intriguing questions worthy of empirical investigation: Do per diem arguments affect jurors’ noneconomic damage awards?
If so, are these effects larger compared to when lump
sums or no per diem arguments are used? We designed
the present study to provide preliminary answers to
these questions and to stimulate future research on attorneys’ use of per diem arguments in civil litigation.

heuristics are quite useful, they sometimes lead to troublesome and systematic errors. One common heuristic involves an “anchoring and adjustment” process
in which people make estimates by starting at an initial value that eventually is adjusted to yield a final answer. Sources of the initial value or starting point may
be external (suggested by another person) or internal
(based on a partially performed computation) and both
exert an influence on the final judgment rendered. In
short, “different starting points yield different estimates,
which are biased toward the initial values” (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974, p. 1128).

Previous Research on Per Diem Arguments

Researchers have documented anchoring and adjustment effects in various civil trial simulations (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Hinsz & Indahl, 1995; Marti &
Wissler, 2000). These effects generally take one of two
forms: assimilation (movement of the response toward
the anchor) or contrast (movement of the response away
from the anchor). College students in an experiment by
Chapman and Bornstein (1996) awarded more money to
the plaintiff as the size of her attorney’s lump sum request ($100, $20,000, $5 million, or $1 billion) increased.
Yet more recent research by Marti and Wissler (2000)
suggests that there are limits to how much plaintiff attorneys should ask for and that too large a request may
backfire. In that experiment, the plaintiff requested either $1.5 million, $15 million, or $25 million for his pain
and suffering after a workplace accident that was the
defendant’s fault. College students awarded the least
amount of money in the $1.5 million condition; however, the average award was greater in the $15 million condition than in the $25 million condition. Based
on those findings, Marti and Wissler echoed the earlier
sentiments of Chapman and Bornstein by agreeing that
“the more you ask for, the more you get” but also cautioned “be careful what you ask for.”
Anchors appear to affect the variability of mock jurors’ pain and suffering awards similarly to how they
affect award size. In general, award variability increases
as the size of the award request increases (Malouff &
Schutte, 1989), although the data on this point are somewhat inconsistent (Marti & Wissler, 2000).

Empirical research on per diem arguments is surprisingly scant. We are aware of only one other study that
has examined the effect of per diem arguments on jurors’ pain and suffering awards. In that study, researchers included seven variations of a per diem argument
presented by the plaintiff’s attorney in a series of personal injury cases (Laughery, Paige, Bean, & Wogalter, 2001). College students read one of five per diem
amounts suggested to compensate the victim for his/her
life expectancy ($1, $50, $100, $200, or $1000 per day),
a multiple-rate condition consisting of a table that presented the first four rates, or a no per diem control. Even
though participants’ damage awards in the control, $1,
$50, $100, and multiple-rate arguments were not significantly different from each other, they were smaller than
those in the $200 condition, and all six versions led to
smaller awards than the $1000/day argument condition.
The Laughery et al. (2001) experiment is important
because it was the first to investigate the effects of different per diem arguments on jurors’ noneconomic
damage awards. At the same time, however, the study’s
main finding that larger per diem arguments led to
larger awards seems to be more indicative of jurors’
general tendency to anchor on amounts provided by attorneys (making larger awards in response to larger requests) than it is an investigation of how different dollar/time quantifications of the same absolute amount
for the plaintiff’s pain and suffering (e.g., $10/hour versus $240/day) would influence jurors’ awards.

Effects of Anchors on Award Size and Variability

Anchoring and Jurors’ Noneconomic Damage Awards

Psychological Processes Underlying the Effects of Anchors on Awards

Social scientists have discovered that people rely on various heuristic principles to reduce the complexity of different judgment tasks, especially those involving uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Although these

Whether examining the effects of anchors on award size
or variability, it is crucial to consider the underlying
psychological processes. Marti and Wissler (2000) suggested three possible factors that determine whether a
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particular anchor produces assimilation or contrast. The
first two factors involve the perceived discrepancy between the anchor and either the target stimulus or the
individual’s initial position. Essentially, more moderate
anchors tend to produce assimilation whereas more extreme anchors tend to produce contrast. Hence, an attorney’s suggested damage award (anchor) that is extremely discrepant from the plaintiff’s perceived pain
and suffering (target stimulus) or a juror’s internal sense
of appropriate compensation for the harm suffered (individual’s initial position) is more likely to result in contrast than a more moderate, better-matching award. The
third factor involves whether an individual believes
his or her judgment is being influenced by the suggested anchor. Anchors that are perceived as deliberate attempts to bias an individual’s judgment are likely
to result in contrast or no movement toward the anchor
rather than assimilation.
Anchors in the form of per diem arguments or lump
sum requests also may affect certain trial-related attitudes and beliefs, which in turn could influence the
size and variability of jurors’ awards. Past research has
shown that lump sum anchors have little effect on the
plaintiff’s perceived pain and suffering (Chapman &
Bornstein, 1996; Marti & Wissler, 2000), but they can increase jurors’ perceptions of the plaintiff’s selfishness
when the lump sum is characterized as being larger
than the average request in similar cases (Chapman &
Bornstein, 1996). Less is known about whether lump
sums influence jurors’ evaluations of the attorneys’ closing arguments or the perceived difficulty of picking an
exact figure to compensate the plaintiff for her injuries,
and no research has addressed the effects of per diem
arguments on these attitudes.
Overview
We designed the present experiment to examine the effects of different dollar/time per diem arguments, a
lump sum, or no award recommendation on jurors’
noneconomic damage awards in a simulated personal
injury case in which liability already had been established. In addition to this novel anchor manipulation,
we sought to improve the ecological validity of research
on jurors’ damage awards by sampling jury-eligible
community members instead of college students.
To determine the specific amount requested in the
per diem argument and lump sum conditions, we first
presented 35 jury-eligible community members the written trial stimulus (see “Method” for a detailed description) and asked how much money the plaintiff should
receive for the 2 years of pain and suffering she experienced as a result of the defendant’s negligence. We
did not include any award recommendation in this ver-
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sion of the trial. Participants’ pain and suffering awards
ranged from $2,000 to $500,000 with a mean award of
$61,992 (Mdn = $24,000, SD = $118,033).
Consistent with earlier experiments in this area (e.g.,
Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Hinsz & Indahl, 1995;
Marti & Wissler, 2000), we wanted the total amount requested by the plaintiff’s attorney to represent a moderately high anchor that should produce assimilation compared to when no damage award recommendation was
included. We used a lump sum amount of $175,000 because it was nearly three times the average award of our
pilot participants, fell one standard deviation above that
mean value, and could be divided evenly into whole
dollar amounts and time units ($10/hour, $240/day,
and $7300/month).
Hypotheses
We developed four specific hypotheses regarding the
effects of the damage award recommendation variable
on mock jurors’ decisions. Our first two hypotheses focused on the size and variability of participants’ pain
and suffering awards. Consistent with previous anchoring research, we predicted that a moderately high anchor presented to participants in the form of either a per
diem argument or lump sum would increase the size
and variability of pain and suffering awards (assimilation) compared to when no damage award recommendation was presented. We did not anticipate that a combined Per Diem Argument-versus-Lump Sum contrast,
or individual comparisons among the three levels of per
diem argument and the lump sum amount, would reveal any differences because the anchors in these conditions were all functionally equivalent; however, we conducted these analyses to empirically test the assumption
made by some courts that per diem arguments lead to
larger awards and therefore are prejudicial.
Our third hypothesis addressed the question of
whether per diem argument or lump sum anchors
would affect mock jurors’ beliefs about damage awards
and their perceptions of the parties. Specifically, we predicted that participants who received the lump sum
amount would find it easiest to pick a compensation figure, followed by participants who received the per diem
arguments, and followed lastly by participants who received no damage award recommendation. This hypothesis was largely exploratory in nature; however, we
reasoned that participants would find the compensation
task to be more difficult in the per diem argument anchor conditions compared to the lump sum amount condition because the per diem arguments required participants to perform the dollar/time calculation to arrive at
a final damage award. In contrast, the lump sum condition simply provided this amount for participants with-
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out requiring any additional calculations. With respect
to the no award recommendation condition, we anticipated that participants would perceive any help (per
diem argument or lump sum) provided by the plaintiff’s
attorney as simplifying the compensation task compared to when no information was provided. By providing guidance, any recommendation should likewise
make the plaintiff attorney’s closing argument (which
contained the manipulation) more influential than when
no recommendation was provided.
Previous research has shown that different lump sum
requests generally did not change mock jurors’ perceptions of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering (Chapman &
Bornstein, 1996; Marti & Wissler, 2000). Based on those
findings, the equivalence of the total request across conditions, and the fact that we deliberately included a
moderately high anchor designed to produce assimilation and not contrast, we did not expect the manipulation to influence participants’ perceptions of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering or impressions of the plaintiff
and defendant.
Our fourth and final hypothesis predicted that participants’ damage awards would be positively related to
the plaintiff perception variables and negatively related
to the defendant perception variables.
Method
Participants
One hundred-eighty community members residing in
Southern California volunteered for our study or participated in exchange for $10.00. We recruited community members by distributing a flyer that described the
research participation opportunity in our local community and by offering students extra-credit for referring extended family members to participate in the research. All
participants met the California requirements for jury eligibility: a U.S. citizen who is at least 18 years of age, able
to understand English, and who has not been convicted
of a felony (California Code of Civil Procedure, §203).
Community members averaged 36 years in age and
most were females (58%) and had been in at least one
automobile accident (64%) in which they were at fault
(60%). Most participants had served on a jury before
(85%) but had not been a party in actual legal proceedings (83%). Of those with prior legal involvement, 54%
were plaintiffs in civil cases and 46% were defendants
in either civil or criminal proceedings. Community
members came from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds including: Caucasians (37%), Hispanics, Central/South Americans, Mexicans (24%), African Americans (4%), Middle Easterners (9%), and Asians (26%).
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Trial Stimulus
Participants read a 5-page summary of an automobile negligence case that was based on Abbinante v.
O’Connell (1996) and included introductory remarks
from the judge, opening statements/closing arguments
from both attorneys, summarized testimony from four
witnesses (plaintiff, defendant, treating physician, and
physical therapist), and the standard judicial instructions used in California civil cases.
The basic fact pattern of the case was that an inattentive driver (defendant) accidentally struck an 18-year-old
female pedestrian (plaintiff) when swerving to avoid a
rearend collision with the car in front of him. The plaintiff suffered compression fractures to her lumbar vertebrae and spent two nights in intensive care. After being
discharged from the hospital, she continued to experience intense back pain, as well as limited physical mobility, weakness and numbness in her legs, and severe
headaches. The plaintiff took daily doses of prescription
painkillers for her back injuries and was forced to wear
a hyperextension back brace. The plaintiff’s injuries prevented her from participating in many activities she had
previously enjoyed on a regular basis, including sports
and other recreational activities. Two years passed before
the plaintiff fully recovered from her injuries.
At trial, the plaintiff’s treating physician testified on
her behalf as an expert witness. He explained that the
plaintiff’s injuries were the common result of compression fractures. The symptoms of numbness and weakness in her legs were caused by swelling at the fracture
site and increased pressure on her spinal cord. He also
testified that frequent, severe headaches were typical
symptoms of similar back injuries and that the medication he prescribed was necessary for the plaintiff to cope
with the tremendous amount of pain she was experiencing during her recovery.
The physical therapist who cared for the plaintiff also
testified as an expert witness. She testified that hyperextension back braces are common in cases of compression
fractures in order to keep the spine stable and to protect the spinal column during recovery. She explained
that for the types of injuries sustained by the plaintiff,
treatment can involve years of therapy and that patients
often are not able to work or participate in any vigorous physical activity for an extended period of time. She
concluded by noting that the nature and duration of the
plaintiff’s physical therapy was typical and not out of
the ordinary.
Design and Dependent Measures
The study consisted of a 5 Damage Award Recommendation ($10/hour, $240/day, $7300/month, $175,000
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lump sum, No Award Recommendation) betweengroups factorial design. This variable was manipulated
in the plaintiff attorney’s closing argument. For example, in the $10/hour condition he concluded by stating:
When deciding how much money to award Rebecca
[plaintiff], we ask that you keep in mind one simple
question: How much money is Rebecca’s two years
of physical pain and mental suffering worth? We argue that $10.00 for every hour of pain and suffering
would reasonably compensate Rebecca for her injuries. Please ensure that justice is served today by
awarding Rebecca the compensation she deserves
for the pain and suffering she endured due to Mr.
Rumson’s [defendant] negligence.
The other conditions substituted different amounts
($240/day, $7300/month, or $175,000) and the control
condition included the same language above minus the
sentence containing the specific monetary recommendation. The defense attorney’s closing argument did
not address the specific amount requested by the plaintiff’s attorney; however, he concluded by stating “Justice is not served by awarding the plaintiff the excessive
amount of money she is seeking in this action” in every
condition.
We included a series of dependent measures to determine the effects of our experimental manipulation
on mock jurors’ decisions. The first item was an openended question asking participants how much money
they thought the plaintiff should receive to compensate for her pain and suffering only. Next, participants
used 7-point, Likert-type scales to indicate the severity
of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering (1 = Not at all, 7 =
Extremely), overall evaluations of the plaintiff and defendant (1 = Extremely Negative, 7 = Extremely Positive), how influential each of the attorneys’ closing arguments was (1 = Not at all Influential, 7 = Extremely
Influential), and the difficulty of picking an exact figure to compensate the plaintiff for her injuries (1 = Extremely Easy, 7 = Extremely Difficult). Finally, participants completed a multiple-choice manipulation check
to ensure that they were able to identify the appropriate
damage award request provided by the plaintiff’s attorney in each of their respective conditions and rated their
level of motivation when reading the trial stimulus and
determining damages (1 = Not at all Motivated, 7 = Extremely Motivated).
After completing those dependent measures, participants provided demographic information about their
gender, age, jury eligibility, racial/ethnic identity, automobile accident history (number of accidents and fault),
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and previous involvement in legal proceedings (civil or
criminal, plaintiff or defendant).
Procedure
We collected data in groups of 5–20 participants. After providing informed consent, participants were instructed that the defendant already had been found liable and that their task was to determine how much
money the plaintiff should receive for her pain and suffering. Participants then read the trial summary and
completed the dependent measures. Participants were
randomly assigned to condition and did not deliberate or confer with one another at any point during the
study. Once participants completed the study, they
were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Results
Manipulation Check
Mock jurors noticed the variations in the plaintiff attorney’s damage award recommendation. The percentage
of participants in each condition who reported the correct damage award recommendation was: 95% ($10/
hour), 80% ($240/day), 100% ($7300/month), 93%
($175,000), and 100% (none). All participants were included in the main analyses to ensure adequate statistical power.1
We also conducted a one-way ANOVA with five levels of the Damage Award Recommendation variable to
ensure that there were no systematic differences in participants’ self-reported levels of motivation while reading the trial and determining damages. Random assignment was successful, with no differences emerging
across conditions, F(4, 175) = 0.13, p = .97, partial η 2 =
.01, Grand M = 4.65, SD = 1.59.
Data Analytic Strategy
The amount of dollars awarded for the plaintiff’s pain
and suffering was the major dependent variable in this
experiment. Preliminary analyses revealed that participants’ raw dollar awards were highly variable and positively skewed. Following procedures recommended by
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), awards that were greater
than two standard deviations above the mean in each
condition were recoded to the award amount at two
standard deviations. This transformation has been used
in other damage award research (e.g., Saks, Hollinger,
Wissler, Evans, & Hart, 1997) and is preferred over other

1. We reran all the analyses excluding the 12 participants who did not answer the manipulation check question correctly and the pattern of effects
across the dependent measures was identical to when these participants were included.
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methods such as logarithmically transforming or truncating the data for several reasons. A logarithmic transformation of damage awards recodes all of the data (not
just the outliers) and the resulting values are difficult to
interpret in a meaningful way. This type of transformation would have been particularly problematic in our
study because we were interested in examining differences in the variability of damage awards as a function
of experimental condition. Truncation or the elimination
of extreme values is less desirable than the transformation we performed because it results in the loss of data.
In total, two awards were recoded in each of the $10/
hour, $7300/month, and $175,000 conditions and one
award was recoded in each of the $240/day and no
award recommendation conditions. After this transformation, the distribution of our pain and suffering award
data showed no serious departures from normality.
We subjected participants’ pain and suffering awards,
impressions of the plaintiff and defendant, evaluations
of the attorneys’ closing arguments, and perceived difficulty of picking an exact figure to compensate the plaintiff for her injuries to a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) to explore whether the composite of these
six dependent measures differed as a function of the
Damage Award Recommendation variable. The Pillai’s
Trace criterion revealed a statistically significant effect,
Mult. F(28, 676) = 1.99, p = .002, partial η2 = .09. We followed up the significant multivariate main effect for the
Damage Award Recommendation variable using univariate F tests for each of the six dependent measures.
Hypothesis 1: Size of pain and suffering awards —
The test for the pain and suffering award measure was
statistically significant (see Table 1). Tukey’s post hoc
comparisons revealed that participants’ pain and suffering awards were larger for the $10/hour per diem argument and $175,000 lump sum conditions compared
to the $7300/month per diem argument and no award
recommendation conditions. The difference between
participants’ awards in the $240/day condition and all
other conditions was not statistically significant.
We also conducted two contrasts that combined participants’ damage awards across all three per diem argument levels (M = $107,771; SD = $130,036) and compared
them to damage awards in the lump sum only condition
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and the control condition. Neither contrast reached traditional levels of statistical significance, F(1, 146) = 3.62,
p = .059, partial η2 = .02 and F(1, 146) = 3.37, p = .069,
partial η2 = .03, respectively. A final contrast testing the
effect of a linear trend across the three per diem argument levels was statistically significant, F(1, 105) = 7.84, p
= .006, partial η2 = .07. As the dollar amount in each per
diem argument increased, participants’ damage awards
decreased in a linear fashion (see Table 1).2
Hypothesis 2: Variability in pain and suffering awards
— We examined the effect of our Damage Award Recommendation manipulation on the variability of participants’ pain and suffering awards using a procedure
described by Levene (1960) and used by other civil jury
researchers (Marti & Wissler, 2000; Saks et al., 1997).
We calculated deviation scores by taking the absolute
value of the distance between each participant’s award
and the mean award for his/her experimental condition. We then subjected these deviation scores to a oneway between-subjects ANOVA with five levels of the
Damage Award Recommendation variable. This analysis revealed a statistically significant effect, F(4, 175) =
4.33, p = .002, partial η2 = .09. Tukey’s post hoc comparisons revealed that the $10/hour per diem argument increased the variability in participants’ pain and suffering awards compared to the $7300/month and no
award recommendation conditions (see Table 1).3 No
other comparisons reached traditional levels of statistical significance.
We also conducted two contrasts that combined participants’ deviation scores across all three per diem argument levels (M = $79,562; SD = $96,493,036) and compared them to the deviation scores in the lump sum
only condition and the control condition. The Per Diem
Argument-versus-Lump Sum contrast was nonsignificant, F(1, 146) = 1.16, p = .28, partial η2 = .01; however,
the Per Diem Argument-versus-Control was statistically
significant, F(1, 134) = 4.67, p = .03, partial η2 = .03. A final contrast testing the effect of a linear trend across the
three per diem argument levels was statistically significant, F(1, 105) = 8.67, p = .004, partial η2 = .08. As the
dollar amount in each per diem argument increased, the
variability in participants’ damage awards decreased in
a linear fashion (see Table 1).

2. We acknowledge that this final contrast did not test an a priori hypothesis. It was recommended by a reviewer to test what appeared to be a linear trend in the size of participants’ damage awards as a function of per diem argument in the univariate follow-up test for the statistically significant Damage Award Recommendation effect in the overall MANOVA.
3. One additional insight that we gained from the Levene’s test was that our univariate F test on the size of participants’ pain and suffering awards
violated the homogeneity of variance assumption of ANOVA because the variability in awards was not constant across experimental conditions. To ensure that this heterogeneity of variance did not affect our results in any way, we performed a logarithmic transformation on the pain
and suffering award variable and reran the univariate F test. Without exception, the pattern of results was identical to when the nontransformed
awards were used.
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and univariate effects of damage award recommendation on dependent measures
Dependent measure
Means (SD) 						 Univariate effect of damage
								 award recommendation

Award in dollars
Award deviation
score in dollars
Pain and suffering severity
Plaintiff
Plaintiff closing
Defendant
Defendant closing
Compensate difficulty

F

df

p

partial η2

$10/hour

$240/day

$7300/month $175,000

None

149,614a
(186,369)
117,645a
(143,312)
5.70 (1.22)
4.90 (1.43)
3.95 (1.58)
4.08 (0.89)
3.78 (1.49)
4.74 (1.55)

99,037a,b
(73,580)
60,688a,b
(40,281)
5.57 (1.17)
4.86 (1.38)
3.97 (1.67)
3.69 (1.11)
4.06 (1.78)
4.26 (1.38)

66,316b
(66,434)
53,417b
(38,353)
5.91 (0.95)
4.85 (1.15)
4.12 (1.85)
4.00 (1.25)
3.82 (1.78)
4.63 (1.64)

61,257b
4.34
4,175
0.002
0.09
(60,701)				
39,446b
4.33
4,175
0.002
0.09		
(44,708)
5.30 (1.24)
1.55
4,175
0.19
0.03
5.20 (1.16)
0.39
4,175
0.82
0.01
4.50 (1.20)
1.61
4,175
0.17
0.04
4.03 (0.77)
2.12
4,175
0.08
0.05
4.10 (1.63)
0.28
4,175
0.89
0.01
3.90 (1.73)
1.91
4,175
0.11
0.04

151,758a
(154,611)
97,031a,b
(119,415)
5.36 (1.25)
4.95 (1.32)
4.64 (1.30)
3.50 (1.25)
3.86 (1.48)
4.79 (1.57)

Within each row, means with different superscripts were significantly different at p ≤ .05

Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations among dependent measures

1. Award in dollars
2. Pain and suffering severity
3. Plaintiff
4. Plaintiff closing
5. Defendant
6. Defendant closing
7. Compensate difficulty

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

126,083
5.57
4.94
4.24
3.84
3.91
4.50

214,282 —
0.22** 0.22** 0.16*
-0.11
–0.16* 0.31
1.18 		
—
0.39** 0.29** –0.13
–0.09
0.03
1.29 			
—
0.31** –0.12
–0.07
0.01
1.55 				—
–0.07
–0.20** 0.12
1.09 					—
0.15*
–0.05
1.61 						—
0.04
1.59 							—

* Correlation significant at p ≤ .05
** Correlation significant at p ≤ .01

Hypothesis 3: Attitudinal and belief measures — The
other univariate tests for the effects of per diem argument on participants’ perceptions of the plaintiff’s pain
and suffering, overall impressions of the plaintiff and
defendant, evaluations of the attorneys’ closing arguments, and the difficulty of picking an exact figure to
compensate the plaintiff for her perceived injuries were
not statistically significant (see Table 1).
Hypothesis 4: Correlations among measures — Participants’ damage awards were positively related to their
perceptions of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering, impressions of the plaintiff, and evaluations of the plaintiff attorney’s closing argument at a statistically significant
level (see Table 2). Damage awards were negatively related to participants’ evaluations of the defense attorney’s
closing argument. All three plaintiff measures were positively correlated. For the defendant measures, only participants’ impression of the defendant and the defense
attorney’s closing argument were positively correlated.
Finally, participants’ ratings of the plaintiff and defense
attorney closing arguments were negatively related.

Discussion
Previous research on jurors’ noneconomic damage
awards has presented participants with lump sum requests that vary in size only and found that moderate
anchors produce assimilation whereas extreme anchors
produce contrast (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Marti &
Wissler, 2000). What remained to be seen until now is
how mock jurors respond to the same damage award
recommendation broken down into different dollar/
time units.
Major Findings
Award Size
Depending on the exact dollar/time quantification used,
participants’ pain and suffering awards were similar to
or different from the amounts awarded when a lump
sum or no damage award recommendation was provided. The per diem argument containing the smallest
dollar/time quantification ($10/hour) or the $175,000
lump sum request both increased participants’ awards
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relative to control participants whereas the per diem argument containing the largest dollar/time quantification ($7300/month) did not. These findings suggest that
assimilation effects may be moderated by the format
in which the damage award recommendation is presented to jurors in addition to its size. Moreover, even
though damage awards increased in the $10/hour and
$175,000 lump sum conditions, participants did not simply accept the plaintiff attorney’s damage award recommendation outright: on average, they awarded approximately $25,000 less than what was requested.
The assimilation effects in the $10/hour and $175,000
lump sum conditions are not particularly surprising.
Recall that we deliberately chose an award amount that
was moderately high relative to participants’ awards
when no damage award recommendation was provided. As such, our anchor was more likely to produce
assimilation than contrast because it was not extremely
discrepant from the target stimulus or participants’ initial judgments and it should not have been perceived as
being overly biased (Marti & Wissler, 2000). However,
the same can be said about the other per diem argument
conditions because they were functionally equivalent in
size, and yet neither the $240/day nor $7300/month anchor produced the assimilation effects observed in the
$10/hour and $175,000 conditions.
Perhaps the most straightforward conclusion we can
draw from this result is that mock jurors did not perform the calculations suggested by the plaintiff’s attorney in all of the per diem argument conditions. Had
they relied on the per diem arguments, their damage
awards would not have differed because all three dollar/time quantifications resulted in the same amount
as the lump sum request ($175,000). Yet it does not appear that participants disregarded the per diem arguments altogether either. The fact that pain and suffering awards were virtually identical in the $10/hour
and lump sum conditions suggests that participants in
this condition performed the calculations contained in
the per diem argument. Why then did participants respond differently to the $10/hour and $7300/month
per diem arguments? We can begin by ruling out the
possibility that participants simply did not attend
to our experimental manipulation because the overwhelming majority of participants passed the manipulation check. In addition, no differences emerged for
participants’ self-reported motivation across the experimental conditions.
Instead, what seems more plausible is that participants attended to the damage award recommendations but perceived the $7300/month per diem argument to be excessive compared to the actual worth
of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering or their intuitive,
gut-level sense of an appropriate award amount (e.g.,
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“It’s only $10/hour.” versus “Wow, that’s $7300/
month!”). They also may have viewed the larger dollar/time quantification as an unfair or biased attempt
to persuade them. Any one of these factors would result in no movement toward the anchor or contrast effects (Marti & Wissler, 2000).
To determine whether participants viewed the
$7300/month per diem argument as a larger, more extreme request than the other per diem arguments in our
study, we conducted a short follow-up survey in which
we presented 30 jury-eligible college students a sheet of
paper with one question on each side. On the front, we
listed the three per diem arguments ($10/hour, $240/
day, or $7300/month) and asked participants to circle the per diem argument that they thought would result in the largest damage award for a 2-year period.
Once they answered the first question, we asked participants to turn the paper over and indicate whether they
focused more on the dollar amount or time unit when
answering the first question. Twenty-two participants
(73%) circled the $7300/month per diem argument,
eight (27%) circled the $240/day per diem argument,
and none chose the $10/hour per diem argument in response to the first question. For the second question, 21
participants (70%) reported that they focused more on
the dollar amount compared to nine participants (30%)
who reported focusing more on the time unit.
These data offer some additional insight into jurors’
reactions to per diem arguments. When asked to determine noneconomic damages and presented per diem
arguments containing different dollar/time quantifications of the same amount, mock jurors appear to (1)
focus more on the dollar amounts contained in those
arguments rather than the time units, and (2) perceive
larger dollar amounts as yielding larger awards even
though they are accompanied by correspondingly larger
time units. Why does this occur? Perhaps the overlap between what the compensation task requires and
what the attorney’s per diem argument provides causes
people to focus almost exclusively on the specific dollar amount included in the attorney’s per diem argument. This explanation is also consistent with previous
research indicating that anchors exert the strongest influence on people’s decisions when the anchor and response item are presented on compatible scales (Markovsky, 1988; Chapman & Johnson, 1994).
Finally, it is important to note that our Per Diem Argument-versus-Lump Sum and Per Diem Argumentversus-Control contrasts revealed that the combined effects of per diem arguments on damage award size were
no different from those of the lump sum or control conditions. What appears to matter is not the use of a per
diem argument per se, but instead the size of the dollar/
time quantification contained therein.
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Award Variability
Similar to previous research (Malouff & Schutte, 1989;
Marti & Wissler, 2000), participants’ damage awards became increasingly variable when presented a moderately high anchor compared to no damage award recommendation. However, this only occurred for the $10/
hour per diem argument condition. These findings bear
a strong resemblance to the award size data and can
be best understood in a similar fashion. By knowing in
advance that participants in our pilot study awarded
on average $62,000 for the plaintiff’s injuries, we were
able to select a damage award recommendation that
was moderately higher than what control participants
would award. Thus, receiving the moderate anchor increased the variability of jurors’ awards compared to
when they received no damage award recommendation
and tended to award around $62,000.
This explanation accounts for the increased variability in the $10/hour per diem argument condition, but
what about the lack of effects for the other conditions
that contained different quantifications of the same damage award recommendation? The fact that the variability
in participants’ damage awards for the $7300/month per
diem argument was significantly smaller than for the $10/
hour per diem argument and no different from the control condition suggests once again that participants perceived this amount to be extremely (as opposed to moderately) discrepant from what was appropriate based on the
plaintiff’s pain and suffering or their initial award judgments. These conditions have been shown to produce
contrast effects or a lack of assimilation effects consistent
with our findings (Marti & Wissler, 2000). With respect to
the $175,000 lump sum amount, the two previous experiments that examined award variability used multiple requests that varied in size (as opposed to different quantifications of the same amount) and those awards were
much larger in size relative to pilot study control awards
than our recommendation was. Anchors that are more extreme, by definition, are less restrictive and provide more
opportunity for variability than moderate anchors. Perhaps if we had included a larger lump sum (and larger
per diem arguments, for that matter), we would have observed more differences in award variability.
That said, however, anchor size alone cannot explain
why we observed increased award variability in some
conditions ($10/hour) and not others ($175,000). After
all, the damage award recommendations in these conditions were functionally equivalent when calculated for
the plaintiff’s recovery period. It may be the case that
per diem arguments lead to more variable awards than
lump sums because they provide more opportunity for
adjustment: there is simply more to tinker with. Lump
sum requests can be adjusted in terms of dollar amount
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only whereas per diem arguments can be adjusted in
terms of dollar amount or time units.
Attitudinal Measures
Results did not reveal statistically significant differences on any of the attitudinal measures as a function
of the Damage Award Recommendation variable. Several characteristics of the present study increase our
confidence that the null effects associated with the Damage Award Recommendation variable were not statistical artifacts. First, participants’ responses to the manipulation check question indicated that they attended to
the experimental manipulation when reading the trial
stimulus. Second, post hoc power analyses confirmed
that our study had sufficient power to detect differences
should they have existed. Power was equal to .85 to detect a medium-sized effect given the number of participants in our sample and α = .05 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang,
& Buchner, 2007). Third, as further evidence supporting
the statistical power of the tests, differences relatively
small in size (partial η2 = .09; Cohen, 1988) reached traditional levels of statistical significance in several of the
analyses used to examine our data. Finally, there was
no evidence that the null effects were the result of a restricted response range. Participants’ responses varied
greatly within and among the various dependent measures, and there was no evidence of a floor or ceiling effect. For these reasons, we are confident that the null
effects associated with the damage award request variable reflect a true lack of differences in participants’ responses rather than a statistical artifact.
The fact that different quantifications of the same
damage award request did not affect participants’ perceptions of the parties or their attorneys is reassuring
because these requests are designed primarily to simplify jurors’ task of compensating the plaintiff. If the
Damage Award Recommendation variable had influenced participants’ attitudes toward the parties or their
attorneys, this would have supported legal arguments
and court rulings that these types of arguments are prejudicial; however, that was not the case.
We were surprised by the lack of differences in participants’ perceived difficulty of the damage determination task and do not have a sound explanation for this
finding. Perhaps a self-presentation bias influenced participants such that they reported finding the compensation task easier than it really was or that they were
not influenced by the plaintiff attorney’s closing argument in order to be perceived more favorably by the experimenter (Baumeister, 1982). Other research by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) has shown that participants have
limited awareness of their cognitive processes and that
their reports concerning these are often incorrect.
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The correlational analyses revealed that damage
awards increased as participants evaluated the plaintiff, her attorney, and the degree of pain and suffering
more positively. This finding makes sense, given that
perceptions of the plaintiff (and especially the plaintiff’s
pain and suffering) are the yardstick by which jurors are
asked to measure noneconomic damages. Participants’
overall impressions of the defendant were unrelated to
the size of their damage awards—only a small but statistically significant negative relationship between damage awards and perceptions of the defense attorney’s
closing argument was detected. This outcome is legally
appropriate because noneconomic damages should be
based on the plaintiff’s perceived pain and suffering
and not perceptions of the defendant.
Limitations and Implications for Legal Professionals
Before discussing the implications of our research, we
must acknowledge certain methodological features that
may limit the generalizability of our findings. The written trial summary we developed, although based on an
actual case, constituted a relatively impoverished stimulus compared to the courtroom experience of jurors
in a real case. Participants rendered judgments independently of one another without any tangible consequences for the plaintiff or defendant. Previous research
has shown, however, that the verisimilitude of jury simulation research does not substantially affect its results
(Bornstein, 1999; Kramer & Kerr, 1989) and that jurors’
pre- and post-deliberation verdicts typically do not differ (Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983).
It is also important to keep in mind that we informed
mock jurors in our study that defendant liability had already been established and asked them to determine the
plaintiff’s noneconomic damages only for a fixed period
of time (past pain and suffering). This was done in order to simplify the task and avoid dealing with ambiguous projections about the probable duration of future
pain and suffering. Consequently, our data do not address the possibility that per diem arguments could influence jurors’ liability decisions, economic damage
awards, or future pain and suffering awards. It is possible that per diem arguments would exert a stronger influence in cases involving both past and future pain and
suffering for extended periods of time.
With respect to the use of per diem arguments by
attorneys in actual cases, we do not know how often
per diem arguments contain specific dollar amounts
or whether they are presented to jurors in lieu of or in
addition to a lump sum amount. Our experiment pitted different per diem arguments against an equivalent
lump sum amount. As such, we do not know whether
the reduced damage awards we observed for the larger
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dollar/time quantification would emerge when the per
diem argument is accompanied by a lump sum amount.
Finally, we openly acknowledge that we did not expect mock jurors’ damage awards to vary across the
three different per diem argument conditions. Consequently, all of the explanations we have discussed, although consistent with previous theory and research,
were generated post hoc. Future studies will benefit by
including dependent measures that specifically tap participants’ perceptions of whether the attorney’s award
recommendation is excessive, discrepant from participants’ initial award judgments, or an overly biased attempt to influence their judgments.
Although it is too early to draw definitive conclusions,
we would like to close by considering some potential implications of our results for the legal community. First, attorneys using per diem arguments would be well advised
to choose dollar/time quantifications that are smaller in
size and thus appear more modest to jurors who may be
evaluating the per diem argument using a more superficial type of processing rather than performing the calculation suggested by the attorney in the per diem argument.
Attorneys who would rather avoid the Goldilocks-like
guesswork inherent in determining whether a dollar/
time quantification is “too large, too small, or just right”
may wish simply to avoid the use of per diem arguments
altogether and stick with a lump sum amount. Recall that
when differences between per diem arguments and lump
sums emerged, they were in the negative direction with
per diem arguments reducing (not increasing) participants’ damage awards for the plaintiff.
With respect to judges, some jurisdictions do not allow per diem arguments based on the assumption that
these arguments artificially and excessively inflate jurors’ damage awards. Our findings regarding different
dollar/time quantifications of the same amount indicate that this is not the case. In fact, when larger dollar/time quantifications are used, per diem arguments
may result in smaller damage awards for plaintiffs compared to lump sums or smaller dollar/time quantifications. Per diem arguments also do not lead to a perception of a more effective closing argument. Our data
do, however, indicate that some per diem arguments
may increase the variability in jurors’ damage awards
compared to a lump sum amount or no recommendation. This of course is less desirable because it suggests
that per diem arguments may lead to different awards
for the same injury. Public perceptions of injustice are
bound to increase if like cases are not treated alike by
our legal system. Future research using different dollar
amounts and time units in different types of cases will
help us better understand how the variability, as well as
size, of jurors’ pain and suffering awards is influenced
by attorneys’ use of per diem arguments.
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